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 Athlete Injuries and Performance Enhancing Drug Violations: An Analysis Under Federal Health 
Privacy Law 
Anthony W. Liberatore 
Part 1: Introduction 
There are only four players in the history of Major League Baseball (MLB) to have both 
3,000 hits and 500 home runs.1 One of those players is Rafael Palmeiro. Having already 
reached the 500-homerun milestone in 2003,2 on July 15,2005, Palmeiro hit an RBI double off 
Seattle's Joel Pineiro for his 3,000th Major League hit.3 Many thought he had solidified his 
candidacy for baseball's Hall ofFame.4 Then, on August 1, 2005, Palmeiro became the highest-
profile player, at the time, to be suspended for the league's performance-enhancing drug policy.5 
Major League Baseball's simple press release read: "The Office of the Commissioner of 
Baseball today announced that Rafael Palmeiro of the Baltimore Orioles has been suspended for 
1 0 days, effective today, for violation of Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and 
Treatment Program. "6 
Portland Trail Blazer's forward Darius Miles suffered a micro:fracture in his right knee in 
2006 for which he underwent surgery _7 After a lengthy rehabilitation period, the Trail Blazers 
"first ruled him unfit to play and then sought an independent physician's examination of the 
1 Palmeiro Joins 3,000 Hit-500 HR Club, NBC Sports, July 16, 2005, http:/Jnbcsports.msnbc.com/id/8575040/. 
2 Jesse Sanchez, Palmeiro Slugs SOOth Home Run, MLB.com, May 11,2003, 
http:/ /texas.rangers.mlb.com/news/article.jsp ?ymd=20030511 &content_ id=2 892 82&vkey=recap&fext= Jsp&c _id=t 
ex. 
3 Gary Washburn, Palmeiro Reaches 3,000-hit Plateau, MLB.com, July 15, 2005, 
http://mlb.mJb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20050714&content_id=ll 31415&vkey=news _ bal&fext= .jsp&c _id=bal. 
4Jd ("Palmeiro may have stamped his ticket to Cooperstown by becoming the fourth player to amass 3,000 hits and 
500 homers."); see also Jorge Arangure, Jr., Palmeiro, O's Make It a Special Night, The Washington Post, July 16, 
2005, http://www .washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/artic1e/2005/07/ 15/AR2005071502272.html ("But after 
Friday night, Palmeiro's place in history and in the Hall ofFame is undeniable."). 
s Palmeiro Suspended for Steroids, New York Times, Aug. 2, 2005, 
http://www .nytimes.com/2005/08/0 1/sports/0 1 ihtBASE.html?scp= 1 &sq=palmeiro%2 Osteroids&st=cse; 
6 Press Release, Rafael Palmeiro Suspended 10 Days, MLB.com, Aug. 1, 2005, available at 
http :1/mlb.mlb. com/news/press _releases/press _release.jsp?ymd=20050 801 &content_ id= 1153525&vkey=pr _ mlb&fe 
xt=.jsp&c_id=mlb. 
7 Dwight Jaynes, Blazers Could Come Under Scrutiny for Statements on Miles' Condition, The Portland Tribune, 
July 28, 2008, http://www.portJandtribune.com/sports/story.php?story_id=121693653261551200 
knee. That physician ruled Miles' injury was career ending."8 The Blazers had incentive to hope 
that Miles' injury was career ending: first, his remaining salary would not count against the 
team's salary cap, and, second, insurance would indemnify the team for his remaining salary.9 A 
problem arose, however, when Blazers' General Manager Kevin Pritchard told an 
Oregonlive.com blog that '"Two doctors said Darius had the worst microfracture injury they had 
ever seen ... They would never have him play basketball and the odds of having knew 
replacement surgery is high."'10 Then, Pritchard made further comments regarding the severity 
of Miles' injury to the Portland Tribune. 11 At the time, it was undetermined if the Trail Blazer 
general manager's public comments would preclude Darius Miles from being able to sign with 
another NBA team.12 While Miles was able to sign with the Memphis Grizzlies in 200913 he 
played only in 34 regular season games, as a reserve, before being waived.14 
In 2009 the National Football League (NFL) fined the New York Jets, their General 
Manager Mike Tannenbaum, and former Jets Head Coach Eric Mangini for failing to disclose 
Brett Favre's tom right biceps tendon, which he suffered at the end of the 2008 season.15 The 
8 Jd 
9 ld ("Obviously, that situation creates an incentive for the Blazers to hope Miles never plays again. And perhaps an 
incentive for the team to be as negative as possible in describing Miles' chances of ever playing again -thereby 
discouraging other teams from taking a chance on him."). 
10 ld 
11 Id 
12 Jd C' ... if he does not sign with another team, there is an expectation that Miles could file a grievance with the 
league and also file a suit against the Blazers for attempting to restrict the player's ability to fmd a job.") 
13 Grizzlies Insist Miles Will Help Team, ESPN.com, Jan. 10,2009, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=3822911 ("Miles, who was the third overall pick by the Los Angeles 
Clippers in the 2000 draft, signed a six~year, $48 million deal with Portland in 2004. The Blazers waived Miles at 
the end of the 2007~08 season after an independent doctor determined he hadn't recovered from microfracture 
surgery on his right knee in November 2006."). Miles also signed with the Boston Celtics during the 2008 
offseason. Miles, Thought to Have Career~Ending Injury, Signs With Celtics, ESPN.com, Aug. 22,2008, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=3549061. But, he was waived by the team before the conclusion of the 
NBA training camp, never appearing a regular season game. Celtics Sever Ties to Darius Miles, USA Today, Oct. 
20,2008, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/nba/celtics/2008~10,.20~miles_N.htm. 
14 Tim Povtak, Darius Miles Itching for NBA Return, AolNews, July 21, 2010, 
http://www.aolnews.com/2010/07/21/darius~milles~itching~for~nba~return/. 
15 Jets, Eric Mangini Are Fined $125,000 For Brett Favre Injury Reporting, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 17,2009, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/sep/17 /sports/sp~n:fl~report17. 
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NFL required Favre to be placed on the injury report, but he was not. 16 The NFL instituted the 
injury report in the 1940s, requiring mandatory disclosure of all injuries in order to " ~ensure that 
there are no hidden injuries, or clubs hiding that players might not be available, and then that 
player ends up not being able to play and nobody knew it.'"17 
Albert Pujols is one of the preeminent players throughout all of baseball and, as a result, 
received a substantial payday during the 2011-2012 offseason, when he signed a 1 0-year, $254 
million contract with the Los Angeles Angels. 18 But, Pujols' big payday was not always a sure 
thing; even as recently as June of the 2011 season, when he suffered a fracture of his left 
forearm. 19 It was estimated in June that this injury, which only kept the slugger out of the lineup 
for several weeks, "could translate into $30 million to $50 million in lost salary if the injury is 
career-altering."2° Further, at the time, "[i]n negotiations, the club [Pujols' current team, the St. 
Louis Cardinals] will likely be concerned about whether Pujols' injury could be recurring."21 
Other than being highly successful and accomplished professional athletes, what do 
Rafael Palmeiro, Darius Miles, Brett Favre, and Albert Pujols have in common? The answer: all 
four illustrate why professional athletes' health privacy is important. All four have had their 
private health information spread throughout the public forum, potentially to their detriment. 
There is no question that injuries occur with great regularity and are thus a major part of 
American professional sports organizations?2 Teams rely on healthy players to win games, and, 
16Jd 
17 Mike Reiss, NFL: How Hurt Is He? The Lists Don't Tell, New York Times, Nov. 8, 2006, 
http://www .nytimes.com/2006/11/09/sports/09iht-nfl.34613 96.html. 
18 Albert Pujols, Angels Agree to Deal, ESPN.com, Dec. 9, 2011, http://espn.go.com/los-
angeles/mlb/story I _/id/733 0066/st-louis-cardinals-albert-puj ols-join-1 os-angel es-angels. 
19 Kelsey Volkmann, How Will Pujols' Injury Affect Contract Negotiations?, St. Louis Business Journal, June 21, 
2011, http://www. bizjournals.com/stlouis/news/20 11/06/21 /webster-prof-pujols-could-lose-50m.html. 
20Jd 
21Jd 
22 For example, one study found that from 2002 through 2008 an average of 438.9 MLB players were placed on the 
disabled list and that there was a 37% increase in injuries between 2005 and 2008. Matthew Posner, et al., 
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in tum, remain profitable enterprises. They also rely on player health information when 
negotiating trades and entering into contract negotiations. Athletes themselves rely on their own 
health not only for on-field success, but also for leverage in future contract negotiations. 
Moreover, injuries are a constant source of intrigue and entertainment for many fans. While 
many casual fans glance at injury reports to assess their team's chance of winning a game, 
injuries can pose even larger consequences for gamblers betting substantial sums of money on 
games. The stakes in injury-disclosure are high; yet, the stakes in health privacy are higher. 
It has been argued that 
professional athletes are celebrities working in a segment of the entertainment 
industry. Unfortunately, when they suffer injuries, this is part of the 
entertainment. The occurrence of injuries to public figures is seen to be public 
information, and hence in this sense no one "owns" the information ... Publicly no 
sporting administrator will ever condone violence or injuries in sport, yet a quick 
survey of spectator sports shows a high correlation between popularity and 
potential for injury ?3 
But privacy is something we all expect in our daily lives?4 Just because professional athletes 
work in a segment of the entertainment industry does not mean they should not be afforded the 
same level of privacy that you and I expect. In the case of professional athletes like Rafael 
Palmeiro, Darius Miles, Brett Favre, and Albert Pujols, this expectation of privacy should extend 
to sports injuries and performance-enhancing drug violations. While professional athletes' 
privacy, and the privacy of celebrities in general, is frequently commented on, much of this 
discussion does not focus on athletes' health privacy. Professional athletes must be cognizant of 
Epidemiology of Major League Baseball Injuries, 39 American Journal of Sports Medicine 1676, Aug. 39, 2001. 
Moreover, a recent National Football League Players Association study has determined that brain-trauma incidents 
are 0.25 per team, per game while regular season injuries overall are 2.7 per team, per game. Tim Wendel, The NFL 
Lockout's Health-Care Data, Revealed, Esquire, Jan. 27,2011, http://www.esquire.com/the-side/feature/nfl-lockout-
2011. 
23 J Orchard, Who Owns the Information?, 36 British Journal of Sports Medicine 16-18,2002, available at 
http://www .injuryupdate.com.au/BJSMinfoedit. pdf. 
24 For a detailed account of privacy and a framework for understanding privacy problems, see Daniel J. Solove, A 
Taxonomy ofPrivacy, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477 (2006). 
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their federal health privacy rights. Armed with this knowledge, they would likely be able to 
reasonably limit the disclosure of their personal health information to that which relates to their 
ability to engage in sport activity. Further, athletes would likely be able to employ federal health 
privacy protections as an ameliorative means. That is, they can use these privacy rights to 
extract concessions from the owners in important areas of the Collective Bargaining Agreement 
negotiations, such as minimum salary, pension, or ongoing health insurance access requirements. 
Conversely, professional sports organizations should thoroughly and systematically obtain 
written authorizations from all athletes outlining what disclosures are permitted and to whom 
they are permitted. 
This comment will examine sports injuries and performance-enhancing drug violations in 
professional sports through the lens of federal health privacy rights. First, Part II, provides a 
comprehensive overview of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIP AA), with a particular focus on the relevant Privacy Rule provisions and regulations. Then, 
Part III examines whether professional sports teams are HIP AA covered entities? After 
concluding that professional sports teams should in fact be HIP AA covered entities, Part IV, 
through the lenses of Major League Baseball and the National Basketball Association (NBA), 
examines how professional sports leagues currently handle health privacy. This section looks at 
Collective Bargaining Agreements, Uniform Player Contracts, authorizations as employed by 
MLB, and Performance-Enhancing Drug Program policies. Part V explores how injuries and 
drug violations are typically disclosed to the public, while Part VI concludes this comment 
concludes with several recommendations. First, all professional sports leagues should comply 
with HIP AA Privacy Ru1e requirements by adopting a uniform authorization template. MLB 
currently employs an authorization for the use and disclosure of player health information, which 
5 
could serve as a useful model for professional leagues in developing a HIP AA -compliant 
authorization. Second, professional athletes should be aware of their federal health privacy 
rights, thus enabling those rights to be asserted in future CBA negotiations. 
Part II: A Primer on ffiPAA 
A. A Brief Statutory Overview 
The Health InsuranGe Portability and Accountability Act of 199625 (HIP AA) was 
originally enacted in an effort to implement efficient standards for the electronic transfer of 
health care information and to reduce health care costs.26 Though not originally enacted to 
protect the privacy of health information, privacy has nevertheless become one of the 
predominate focuses ofHIPAA, especially with the adoption of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.27 
HIP AA applies to three different types of entities, known as covered entities: (1) health plans; (2) 
health care clearinghouses; (3) health care providers who transmit any health information in 
25 104 P.L. 101; 110 Stat. 1936. 
26 The stated purpose ofHIPAA: ''It is the purpose of this subtitle to improve ... the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the health care system, be encouraging the development of a health information system through the establishment of 
standards and requirements for the electronic transmission of certain health information." 42 USC § 1320d. 
27 The HIPAA Privacy Rule- officially titled "Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health 
Information" and 1 ocated at 45 CFR Part 160 and Subparts A and E of Part 164 - "establishes national standards to 
protect individuals' medical records and other personal health information ... The Rule requires appropriate 
safeguards to protect the privacy of personal health information, and sets limits and conditions on the uses and 
disclosures that may be made of such information without patient authorization. The Rule also gives patients rights 
over their health information, including rights to examine and obtain a copy of their health records, and to request 
corrections." The Privacy Rule, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, available at 
http://www .hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/privacyrule/index.html. Upon promulgation of the Privacy 
Rule, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) commented: "Until now, virtually no federal rules 
existed to protect the privacy of health information and guarantee patient access to such information. This final rule 
establishes, for the first time, a set of basic national privacy standards and fair information practices that provides all 
Americans with a basic level of protection and peace of mind that is essential to their full participation in their care. 
The rule sets a floor of ground rules for health care providers, health plans, and health care clearinghouses to follow, 
in order to protect patients and encourage them to seek needed care. The rule seeks to balance the needs of the 
individual with the needs of the society. It creates a framework of protection that can be strengthened by both the 
federal government and by states as health information systems continue to evolve." Federal Register Volume 65, 
Number 250, Dec. 28, 2000 at 82464. HHS went on to discuss the importance of privacy, noting that privacy is a 
fundamental right and that at the time (that is, in 2000) there was increasing public concern about the loss of 
privacy. Jd at 82464-82465. 
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connection with a standard transaction.28 The sole focus of this article is the third type of 
covered entities: health care providers who transmit any health information in connection with a 
standard transaction. 
B. A Few Necessary Operational Definitions 
1. Covered Entities and Health Care 
A health care provider, which is the type of covered entity with which this article will 
focus is "a provider of medical or health services ... , and any other person furnishing health care 
services or supplies."29Health care, as provided by health care providers, "means care, services, 
or supplies related to the health of an individual."30 The provision of health care by covered 
entities results in health information. 
2. Health Information 
Health information is defined under the HIP AA statute to include any information that is 
created by a health care provider and that "relates to the past, present, or future physical or 
mental health or condition of an individual [or] the provision ofhealth care to an individua1."31 
2842 U.S.C. § 1320d-1(a)(l)-(3) (1996); Detailed explanation of electronic data interchange via standard transaction, 
as is required for a health care provider to be a covered entity, is beyond the scope of this comment. For clarity, 
however, HHS' Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services states that ~~Transactions are electronic exchanges 
involving the transfer of information between two parties for specific purposes. For example, a health care provider 
will send a claim to a health plan to request payment for medical services ... Under HIP AA, if a covered entity 
conducts ... transactions electronically, they must use the adopted standard. This means they must adhere to the 
content and format requirements of each standard." Transactions and Code Set Standards, U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, available at 
https://www.cms.gov/TransactionCodeSetsStands/; See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102, 160.103 (2006); Transaction 
standards are established by the HIPAA Transaction Rule at 45 C.F.R. Part 162. 
29 1171(3) 
30 45 CFR 160.103. ~~Health care includes, but is not limited to, the following: (1) Preventive, diagnostic, 
therapeutic, rehabilitative, maintenance, or palliative care, and counseling, service, assessment, or procedure with 
respect to the physical or mental condition, or functional status, of an individual or the affects the structure or 
function of the body; and (2) Sale or dispensing of a drug, device, equipment, or other item in accordance with a 
prescription." 
1 § 1171(4); The HIPAA statute defines health information as: "any information, whether oral or recorded in any 
form or medium, that- (A) is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, public health authority, 
employer, life insurer, school or university, or health care clearinghouse; and (B) relates to the past, present, or 
future physical or mental health or condition of an individual, the provision of health care to an individual, or the 
past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to the individual." 
7 
Further, some health information can be classified as individually identifiable health information, 
which is any information that is created by a covered entity during or as a result of the provision 
of health care that identifies the individual "with respect to which there is a reasonable basis to 
believe that the information can be used to identify the individual."32 
3. Use of Health Information 
Once a covered entity - a health care provider - has provided health care, the covered 
entity may only use the collected health information for certain, limited purposes. Disclosure, 
under HIP AA, "means the release, transfer, provision of, access to, or divulging in any other 
manner of information outside the entity holding the information."33 Further, disclosure can only 
occur to the extent minimally necessary/4 meaning that a covered entity must make all 
reasonable efforts not to use or disclose more protected health information than is necessary to 
accomplish the specific purpose of the use or disclosure. 35 
C. General Structure of the Privacy Rule 
The HIP AA Privacy Rule - Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health 
Information36 - is administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) 
Office Civil Rights (OCR).37 Under the Privacy Rule, individually identifiable health 
32 § 1171(6); (6)(B)(2). 
33 45 CFR 160.103 
34 Covered entities must act only to the extent reasonably necessary in: using health information, disclosing health 
information, and requesting health information. 45 CFR 164.502(b). 
35 ld; Consider, also, that "A covered entity must develop policies and procedures that reasonably limit its 
disclosures of, and requests for, protected health information for payment and health care operations to the minimum 
necessary. A covered entity also is required to develop role-based access policies and procedures that limit which 
members of its workforce may have access to protected health information for treatment, payment, and health care 
operations, based on those who need access to the information to do their jobs. However, covered entities are not 
required to apply the minimum necessary standard to disclosures to or requests by a health care provider for 
treatment purposes." Uses and Disclosures for Treatment, Payment, and Health Care Operations, U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services, available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding!coveredentities/usesanddisclosuresfortpo.html. 
36 45 CFR Part 160 and Subparts A and E of Part 164. 
37 See, generally, supra note 18. 
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information may be used and/or disclosed for only certain limited purposes. 38 Covered entities 
are permitted to use or disclose health information when giving it to the individual patient and 
for treatment, payment, and health care operations ("TP0").39 Outside of these permitted uses or 
disclosures, covered entities must generally obtain a written authorization from the patient40 or 
must provide the patient with the opportunity to accept or reject the proposed use or disclosure.41 
An opportunity to accept or reject requires the covered entity to first inform the patient in 
advance of the proposed use or disclosure and then provide three options to the patient: (1) agree 
to the use or disclosure; (2) prohibit the use or disclosure; or (3) restrict the use or disclosure.42 
In contrast to an authorization, an opportunity to accept or reject may be done orally; however, 
documentation is recommended.43 
Covered entities are required to provide notice of their privacy practices. 44 Health care 
providers with a direct treatment relationship45 must make a good faith effort to obtain written 
acknowledgement of receipt of notice of privacy practices.46 Further, covered entities must post 
their Notice of Privacy Practices and, further, must provide this notice upon request.47 
38 45 CFR § 164.502. 
39 ld Use and disclosure of protected health infonnation is also pennitted, and sometimes required, under some 
more specialized circumstances. For example, as required for public health purposes or under a limited data set. 
See 45 CFR § 164.514(e). 
40 45 CFR 164.508 
41 45 CFR 164.510 
42ld 
43Jd. 
44 45 CFR 164.520 
45 HDirect treatment relationship means a treatment relationship between an individual and a health care provider that 
is not an indirect treatment relationship ... [An] Indirect treatment relationship means a relationship between an 
individual and a health care provider in which: (1) The health care provider delivers health care to the individual 
based on the orders of another health care provider; and (2) The health care provider typically provides services or 
products, or reports the diagnosis or results associated with the health care, directly to another health care provider, 
who provides the services or products or reports to the individual." 45 CFR 164.501. 
46 45 CFR 164.520( c )(2) 
47 45 CFR 164.520(c)(2)(iii)(B), (iv) 
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In addition to the right to request and review a covered entity's privacy practices, 
individuals also have a right to restrict privacy protection. 48 Individuals are permitted to request 
restrictions on the use and disclosure of health information, even for treatment, payment, and 
health care operations, for which disclosure is generally permitted.49 Though the covered entity 
is not generally required to restrict, once a requested restriction is agreed to, the covered entity 
must document the restriction and follow it. 50 That is, once a health care provider agrees to a 
privacy restriction, it cannot reveal personal health information under any circumstance, except 
as permitted by the individual patient. 
The Privacy Rule further requires covered entities to comply with certain administrative 
requirements. 51 Covered entities must document, for example, a privacy official, who is 
responsible for developing and implementing its privacy policies and procedures, 52 as well as a 
contact for privacy complaints, training for their workforce, and sanctions for privacy violations 
by their workforce. 53 
D. Statutorily-Created Hybrid Covered Entities 
The HIPAA Statute allows for hybrid entities. 54 When a single covered entity's business 
activities include both covered (i.e., the provision of health care to injured athletes) and non-
covered functions (i.e., professional baseball operations), that covered entity must divorce its 
48 45 CFR 164.522 
49Jd; see supra, note 28 and accompanying text. 
sold 
51 45 CFR 164.530 
52 Summary of the Privacy Rule, United States Department of Health & Human Services Office for Civil Rights, 
OCR Privacy Brief 14 (2003), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf. 
53Jd; An exhaustive list of administrative requirements includes: documenting a privacy official, documenting a 
contact for privacy complaints, documenting training for workforce, documenting sanctions for privacy violations, 
documenting mitigation of violations, documenting compliance policies and procedures, documenting the Notice of 
Privacy Practices, complying with updates to laws and regulations, refraining from intimidating or retaliatory acts 
when privacy violations have been unearthed, and retaining all documentation for six years. 45 CFR 164.530. 
54 45 CFR 164.103 
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health care component from its non-health care component for purposes of HIP AA compliance. 55 
Essentially, a covered entity that engages in both covered and non-covered functions must 
segregate the non-covered functions from the covered, health care functions, and are "required to 
create adequate 'frrewalls' between the health care component(s) and other components. 
Transfer [of health information] held by the health care component to other components of the 
hybrid entity is a disclosure subject to the HIP AA privacy rule.56 
Part III: Professional Sports Teams: Are They Covered Entities and Are They Subject to 
IDPAA? 
A. Covered Entity: Definition Applied 
At the inception of the HIP AA Privacy Rule professional sports leagues57 and teams 
began to worry whether HIP AA regulations and requirements would wholly forbid them from 
disclosing athletes' injuries.58 HHS responded to the sport industry's worry about HIPAA 
Privacy Rule requirements in a most cryptic way: "'Professional sports teams are unlikely to be 
covered entities' under HIPAA and 'Even if a sports team were to be a covered entity, 
55Jd A hybrid entity must "designate health care components in accordance with paragraph§ 164.105(a)(2)(iii)(C) 
["the covered entity is responsible for designating the component(s) that are part of one or more health care 
components of the covered entity and documenting the designation in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section, 
provided that, if the covered entity designates a health care component or components, it must include any 
component that would meet the definition of covered entity if it were a separate legal entity"]. 
56 Hybrid Entity (HIPAA), Privacy/Data Protection.Project, University of Miami Miller School of Medicine, 
http://privacy .med.miami.edu/glossary/xd_ hybrids.htm. 
57 Hereinafter, professional sports leagues will refer generally to Major League Baseball (MLB), the National 
Football League (NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA), and National Hockey League (NHL). 
However, this paper's overarching analysis, arguments, and recommendations can be applied to any professional 
sports league. 
58 See, e.g., Bustner Olney, BASEBALL; Law May Forbid League to Say IfPlayer Is Hurt, New York Times, June 
11, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/ll/sports/baseball-law-may-forbid-leagues-to-say-if-player-is-
hurt.html?src=pm; Leagues Seek Relief From Privacy Law, Buster Olney, New York Times, July 4, 2002, 
http://www .nytimes.com/2002/07 /04/sports/leagues-seek-relief-from-privacy-law .html?src=pm; Buster 0 lney, Pro 
Football; League Gain a Measure ofReliefFrom Privacy Laws, New York Times, Aug. 14,2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/14/sports/pro-football-legues-gain-a-measure-of-relief-from-privacy-laws.html 
("Teams were worried about whether trainers and doctors would have to obtain written permission from players to 
discuss medical diagnosis with coaches and management, and whether players could use the privacy rules as 
leverage in trade talks"). 
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employment records of a covered entity are not covered by this rule (emphasis added). '"59 From 
its language, HHS appeared to be giving professional sports teams a "pass," effectively 
exempting them from HIP AA Privacy Ru1e compliance. But, a plain, literal reading of the law 
necessitates the determination that professional sports leagues should be subject to the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule. 
With its uncommitted language, HHS clearly left open the possibility that professional 
sports teams could be covered entities. 60 Moreover, a review of the record demonstrates that 
HHS has not commented on the issue since 2002.61 When it made the declaration that 
professional sports teams are unlikely to be HIPAA covered entities, HHS also said that it would 
disagree with any move to decrease the privacy of players: "No class of individuals should be 
singled out for reduced privacy protections."62 
59 Buster Olney, Pro Football; League Gain a Measure ofReliefFrom Privacy Laws, New York Times, Aug. 14, 
2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/14/sports/pro~football~legues~gain-a-measure-of-relief-from-privacy~ 
laws.html; Federal Register Volume 67, Number 157, Aug. 14,2002 at 53193. 
60 The comment read: ~~one commentator suggested that the health records of professional athletes should qualify as 
'employment records.' As such, the records would not be subject to the protections of the Privacy Rule." HHS 
responded: "Professional sports teams are unlikely to be covered entities. Even if a sports team were to be a covered 
entity, employment records of a covered entity are not covered by this Rule. If this comment is suggesting that the 
records of professional athletes should be deemed 'employment records' even when created or maintained by health 
care providers and health plans, the Department disagrees. No class of individuals should be singled out for reduced 
privacy protections. As noted in the preamble to the December 2000 Rule, nothing in this Rule prevents an 
employer, such as a professional sports team, from making an employee's agreement to disclose health records a 
condition of employment. A covered entity, therefore, could disclose this information to an employer pursuant to an 
authorization." Federal Register Volume 67, Number 157, Aug. 14,2002 at 53193. While this response was 
included in the Federal Register, HHS did not definitively state whether a professional sports team is or is not a 
covered entity, and, moreover, did not definitely state that a prs>fessional sports team could not be a HIP AA covered 
entity. While this comment argues that all professional sports teams should be covered entities for HIPAA purposes, 
it remains unclear how a court would apply administrative deference to the interpretive decision of HHS, as required 
under the Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) and the Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) line of cases. Essentially, HSS did not commit to a specific interpretation of 
whether a professional sports team is, or can be, a HIP AA covered entity. 
61 Id. 
62See Buster Olney, Pro Football; League Gain a Measure ofReliefFrom Privacy Laws, New York Times, Aug. 14, 
2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/14/sports/pro-football-legues-gain-a-measure-of-relief-from-privacy-
laws.html; Federal Register Volume 67, Number 157, Aug. 14,2002 at 53193 ("Even if a sports team were to be a 
covered entity, employment records of a covered entity are not covered by this Rule. If this comment is suggesting 
that the records of professional athletes should be deemed 'employment records' even when created or maintained 
by health care providers and health plans, the Department disagrees. No class of individuals should be singled out 
for reduced privacy protections. As noted in the preamble to the December 2000 Rule, nothing in this Rule prevents 
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Despite all that HHS has said-and failed to say-a literal reading of the HIP AA statute 
supports the position that a healthcare provider transmitting personal health information in the 
sports team setting is a covered entity pursuant to HIP AA. As discussed in Part II, any health 
care provider that transmits personal health information in electronic format, in connection with 
a standard transaction, is a covered entity. Professional sports teams generally employ both team 
trainers and team physicians who administer health care to injured athletes. 63 If any of these 
health care providers ever transmits personal health information electronically-for example, a 
team trainer or physician sending health information about a player to an orthopedic specialist in 
connection with a consultation for a broken elbow-the team is necessarily a covered entity for 
HIP AA purposes. As such, these teams, as covered entities, should be held to comply with 
HIP AA privacy regulations and rules. 
As a covered entity, the chief issue with team trainer and physician disclosures of 
personal health information is not when disclosure is made to team coaches and management. 
Some argue that disclosures of this nature are frequently necessary in the sports employment 
context. The issue, then, is whether sports teams should be able to reveal personal health 
information to the public-for example, to reporters-and to other teams-for example, in 
an employer, such as a professional sports team, from making an employee's agreement to disclose health records a 
condition of employment. A covered entity, therefore, could disclose this information to an employer pursuant to an 
authorization."). 
63 All professional sports teams employ athletic trainers for the health benefit of their athletes. "Athletic trainers ... 
provide their expertise of musculoskeletal injury prevention, rehabilitation and treatment to the professional sports 
world. With their unique skill set, athletic trainers have been trusted by the worlds' best athletes for years. 
Approximately 800 NATA members work for professional teams and leagues, including: the NBA, NFL, [MLB], 
NHL, PGA, professional tennis, auto racing and even the rodeo." Professional Sports Setting, National Athletic 
Trainers' Association, http://www .nata. org/athl etic-training/job-settings/professional-sports-setting. Many 
professional sports teams also directly employ physicians. "Professional teams ... generally hire a physician or a 
group of physicians to provide medical care to their athletes ... Specific duties may include providing pre-season 
physical examinations; diagnosing, treating, and rehabilitating athletic injuries; and providing medical clearance for 
an athlete to play the sport. The team physician may also be responsible for overseeing all sports medicine services 
provided to a team's athletes and for the supervision of physician assistants, athletic trainers, student assistants, 
physical therapists, and nurses providing medical care to athletes." Matthew J. Mitten, Emerging Issues in Sports 
Medicine: A Synthesis, Summary, and Analysis, 76 St. John's L. Rev. 5, 8, 2002. 
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contract or trade negotiations-without first obtaining the player's permission. Moreover, 
should professional athletes be required to give such permission in order to play? 
B. As Covered Entities, Professional Sports Teams Must be Hybrid Covered Entities 
The provision of health care services is only one minor part of professional sports teams' 
operations. That is, only a select few team employees are engaged in the provision of health 
care; most team employees have nothing to do with the provision of any health care or medical 
services. Thus, sports teams must segregate their health care component (''HCC")-that is, team 
doctors and trainers, nurses, etc.-from the rest of the organization. 64 Only members of the 
team's HCC can ever access, use, or disclose personal health information and, moreover, 
members of the HCC may only do so within their job scope. Essentially, organizational 
members in the non-health care component should not have any access to personal health 
information without direct patient authorization. 65 Thus, sports teams should be designated as 
two organizations, or entities, under HIPAA: (1) the health care component, including team 
trainers and physicians, and (2) everyone else, including management, ownership, and public 
relations personnel. 
Part IV: How Do Professional Sports Leagues Currently Handle Health Privacy? 
64 See discussion, supra, Part II(D). 
65llliS maintains: "To become a hybrid entity, the covered entity must designate and include in its health care 
component all components that would meet the defmition of a covered entity if those components were separate 
legal entities. (A covered entity may have more than one health care component.) However, the hybrid entity is not 
permitted to include in its health care component other types of components that do not perform the covered 
functions of the covered entity or components that do not perform support activities for the components performing 
covered functions. That is, components that do not perform health plan, health care provider, or health care 
clearinghouse functions and components that do not perform activities in support of these functions (as would a 
business associate of a separate legal entity) may not be included in a health care component. Within the hybrid 
entity, most of the HIPAA Privacy Rule requirements apply only to the health care component, although the hybrid 
entity retains certain oversight, compliance, and enforcement obligations." U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacylhipaa/faq/ferpa_and_hipaa/522.html. 
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Professional sports leagues and teams currently handle health privacy in a variety of 
ways: through Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs), Uniform Player Contracts (UPCs), 
and Performance Enhancing Drug Policies. Using two of the major U.S. sports leagues, Major 
League Baseball and the National Basketball Association, as examples,66 this section will 
identify the different ways in which professional sports leagues, and thus their teams, handle 
health privacy. 
A. Collective Bargaining Agreements 
Professional athletes in the four major professional sports leagues are members of players 
associations. 67 The players associations negotiate, on the player's behalf, with the professional 
sports teams to produce a collective bargaining agreement that governs the relationship between 
teams and players. 68 A negotiated collective bargaining agreement "govern[ s] the professional 
sports players' compensation, the procedures for settling disputes, and address a myriad of other 
issues relating to the employer-employee relationship in sports."69 Because these CBAs are the 
"supreme governing authority" concerning employment matters within the professional sports 
66 In addition to the MLB and NBA, however, professional athletes in the following leagues are members of player's 
associations: Arena Football League, Major Indoor Lacrosse League, Major League Baseball, Major League Soccer, 
National Basketball Association, National Football League, National Hockey League, Women's National Basketball 
Association, and North American minor leagues of hockey. While I focus on both MLB and the NBA, the National 
Football League and the National Hockey League round out the four major professional sports leagues in the United 
States. 
67 The four major leagues are: Major League Baseball, National Football League, National Basketball Association, 
and National Hockey League. ''Professional athletes in the following leagues are members of players associations: 
Arena Football League, Major Indoor Lacrosse League, Major League Baseball, Major League Soccer, National 
Basketball Association, National Football League, National Hockey League, Women's National Basketball 
Association, and North American minor leagues of hockey." See Lisa Pike Masteralexis, Drug Testing Provisions: 
An Examination of Disparities in Rules and Collective Bargaining Agreement Provisions, 40 New Eng. L. Rev. 775, 
note 1 (2006). While collective bargaining negotiations are commonplace in the major professional leagues today, 
collective bargaining in professional sports is a relatively new development. James T. Gray & Martin J. Greenberg, 
Sports Law Practice§ 1.05 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 3d ed. 2011). 
68 See Ryan T. Dryer, Beyond the Box Score: A Look at Collective Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports 
and Their Effect on Competition, 2008 J. Disp. Resol. 267 (2008). 
69 I d. at 267. 
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leagues,70 players associations, as the entities that negotiate for the athletes, wield great influence 
and power.71 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provides for the collective bargaining process 
that permits professional athletes and their respective leagues to negotiate over league policies 
and regulations.72 In American League ofProfl Baseball Clubs v. Ass'n of National Baseball 
League Umpires the NLRA established that its jurisdiction encompasses professional sports 
leagues.73 Thus, professional athletes, typically through a player's association, are free to 
negotiate terms of employment, including health privacy. 74 If both parties-the athletes and the 
league-negotiate in good faith and if the bargaining is conducted at arm's-length, a CBA results 
that governs the athletes' employment.75 
70 Matthew J. Parlow, Professional Sports League Commissioners' Authority and Collective Bargaining, 11 Tex. 
Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 179, 196-7 (201 0); see also Matthew A. Mahone, Jr., Sentencing Guidelines for the Court of 
Public Opinion: An Analysis of the National Footban League's Revised Personal Conduct Policy, 11 Vand. J. Ent. 
& Tech. L. 181, 192 (2008). 
71 See George T. Stiefel Til, Hard Ban, Soft Law in MLB: Who Died and Made Wada the Boss?, 56 Buff. L. Rev. 
1225, 1257-64 (2008) for an examination of the unique qualities that characterize Major League Baseball Player's 
Association (MLBPA) and the power it has. 
72 29 u.s.c. § 151-159; see also 29 u.s.c. § 159(d) e'to bargain collectively is the performance ofthe mutual 
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to ... confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment"); The NLRA confers on players specific rights upon entering 
into labor negotiations with management, including that "employees sha11 have the right to self~organization, to form, 
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain conectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to 
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of co11ective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and 
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be 
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized 
in section [158(a)(3) ofthis title]." 29 U.S.C.§ 157. 
73 American League ofPro:fl Baseban Clubs v. Ass'n ofNat'l Baseball League Umpires, 180 NLRB 190, 191 
(1969). 
74See Christian Dennie, From Clarett to Mayo: The Antitrust Labor Exemption Argument Continues, 8 Tex. Rev. 
Ent. & Sports L. 63 (2007), for an outline of some of the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining in professional 
sports; see generally Ryan T. Dryer, Beyond the Box Score: A Look At Collective Bargaining Agreements in 
Professional Sports and Their Effect on Competition, 2008 J. Disp. Resol. 267 (2008) (for a surveying of some of 
fundamental aspects of collective bargaining in professional sports); It has been argued that "mandatory subjects of 
collective bargaining within a sports setting basicany cover an aspects of professional sports: The phrase 'wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment' covers so wide a range of items, it is possible and even likely 
that in the long run virtually an aspects of professional sports, :from contract provisions to play, scheduling, 
equipment design, and game rules will be the subject of collective bargaining proposals at one time or another." 
James T. Gray & Martin J. Greenberg, Sports Law Practice§ 1.05[2] (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 3d ed. 2011) 
(~uoting L. Sobel, Professional Sports and the Law 299 (1977)). 
7 See George T. Stiefel Til, Hard Ball, Soft Law in MLB: Who Died and Made Wada the Boss?, 56 Buff. L. Rev. 
1225, 1229 (2008). 
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1. Major League Baseball 
The 2007-2011 Major League Baseball Collective Bargaining Agreement ("MLB 
CBA") 76 includes extensive provisions regarding health privacy. First, the MLB CBA requires 
that each player, upon reporting to spring training or signing a UPC for that season, whichever is 
first, execute an authorization for the use and disclosure of health information. 77 Second, a club 
physician or trainer is authorized to disclose "all relevant medical or health information 
concerning the Player" to certain persons and entities, including the employing club. 78 Third, for 
public relations purposes, teams are permitted to disclose general information about "the nature 
of a Player's employment-related injury ... the prognosis and the anticipated length of recovery 
from the injury, and ... the treatment or surgical procedures undertaken or anticipated in regard to 
the injury."79 The MLB CBA, as currently negotiated, clearly requires Major League Baseball 
players to waive their federal health privacy rights through authorization. Thus, if players want 
to play for an MLB team in any given year, they must be willing to sign the required 
authorization and permit the disclosure of their health information. 80 
76 MLB CBA, available at http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_ english.pdf; In 2011 MLB and the MLB Player's 
Association reached a new labor agreement. This new agreement has not been fully implemented as of the time of 
this writing and therefore I do not rely upon it as an accurate representation ofMLB's currently enforced policies. 
See MLB Press Release, MLB, MLBPA Reach New Five-Year Labor Agreement, Nov. 22,2011, available at 
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/articlejsp?ymd=20111122&content_id=26025138&vkey=pr_mlb&c_id=mlb. 
77 MLB CBA, Article XIII(G)(1). 
78 
"A Club physician or trainer treating a Player ... and any other physician or medical professional treating or 
consulting with a Player ... is authorized to disclose all relevant medical or health information concerning the Player 
to (a) the Club by which the Player is employed, including the Club officials set out in the Authorization, (b) any 
entity from which such Club seeks to procure, orhas procured, an insurance policy covering such Player's life or any 
disability, injury or illness such Player may suffer or sustain, (c) ... physicians and officials of a Club contemplating 
the assignment ofthe Player's UPC, and (d) ... the Office ofthe Commissioner." MLB CBA, Article XIII(G)(2). 
7~B CBA, Article XIII(G)(3). This provision further states: "For any other medical condition that prevents a 
player from rendering services to his Club, a Club may disclose only the fact that a medical condition is preventing 
the Player from rendering services to the Club and the anticipated length of the Player's absence from the Club. A 
Club physician or trainer treating a Player pursuant to Regulation 2 of his UPC and any other physician or medical 
professional treating or consulting with a Player pursuant to Regulation 2 or Article XIII(D) shall be prohibited from 
making any public disclosure of a Player's medical information absent a separate, specific written authorization 
from the Player authorizing such public disclosure." 
80 The required authorization (''Authorization") can be located at Attachment 18 to the MLB CBA. MLB CBA, 
available at http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_ english.pdf. 
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2. National Basketball Association 
The National Basketball Association and the NBA Players Association agreed to a new 
CBA in December 2011.81 As a result of a lockout that lasted 161 days, and CBA negotiations 
that were ongoing for months, the start of the 2011~2012 NBA season was delayed and the 
season ultimately shortened.82 A 66~game schedule began on December 25,2011, which will be 
governed by the newly agreed to CBA. 83 Although the new NBA CBA is now in effect, the 
previous NBA CBA 84 will serve as the focus for this comment. 85 
Like the MLB CBA, the NBA CBA permits teams to make public medical information 
relating to their players. 86 The provision on the release of medical information, however, 
restricts disclosure to information related to the reasons why a player is unable to participate in 
team activities, including games. 87 Further, a player or his immediate family has the right to 
approve the terms and timing of the public release "of any medical information relating to any 
injuries or illnesses suffered by the player that are potentially life~ or career~ threatening, or that 
do not arise from the player's participation in NBA games or practices."88 The NBA CBA,just 
like the MLB CBA, clearly requires professional basketball players to waive their privacy rights 
81 Players, Owners Approve Agreement, ESPN.com, Dec. 9, 2011, http://espn.go.com/nba/story/ _/id/7332374/nba-
labor-players-owners-vote-ratify-new-labor-agreement. 
82 Jd; See, also, Howard Beck, N.B.A. Talks Stall and More Games Are Canceled, New York Times, Oct. 28,2011, 
http://www .nytimes.com/20 1111 0/29/sports/basketball/nba-talks-stall-and-more-games-are-expected-to-be-
canceled.html. 
83 Players, Owners Approve Agreement, ESPN.com, Dec. 9, 2011, http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/7332374/nba-
labor-players-owners-vote-ratify-new-labor-agreement. 
84 NBA CBA, available at https://www2.bc.edu/-yen/Sports/NBA %20CBA.pdf. 
85 While there is a now a new NBA CBA in effect, it was not fully implemented at the writing of this comment. 
Consequently, this comment uses the former CBA to analyze the NBA's handling of athlete health privacy. The 
contents of the respective CBAs were not a factor in the decision to use the former CBA as the focus of this 
comment's analysis. 
86 NBA CBA, Article XXII(3) Release of Medical Information: ''Subject to subsection (b) below, each Team may 
make public medical information relating to players in its employ, provided that such information relates soley to 
the reasons why any such player has not been or is not rendering services as a player." 
87ld 
88 NBA CBA, Article XXII(3)(b ); While a player or his immediate family has the right to approve the terms and time 
of the public release of certain medical information, the NBA CBA does not define immediate family nor does it 
specifically indicate in what circumstances the immediate family may exercise this right. 
18 
in order to participate in the NBA. In contrast to MLB, however, the NBA CBA does not 
include an authorization, HIP AA~compliant or otherwise, that players are required to sign. But, 
the NBA UPC does include such an authorization.89 
B. Uniform Player Contracts 
In addition to CBAs, Uniform Player Contracts also contain expansive health privacy 
provisions. UPCs are often found within CBAs and are standard form contracts that remain 
constant from team to team. 90 Once a player agrees to sign with a team, "the player signs a 
'standard' or 'uniform' player contract, the terms of which, according to league rules, cannot be 
varied from player to player or team to team, except as to salary."91The MLB and NBA UPCs 
illustrate that UPCs contemplate health privacy. 
1. Major League Baseball 
The MLB UPC,92 as included in the MLB CBA, speaks directly to the use and disclosure 
of players' personal health information. Clause 6(b), titled "Medical Information," provides that 
a club's physician or any medical professional consulted by the player "may furnish to the Club 
all relevant medical information relating to the Player."93 The UPC does not provide guidance as 
to what constitutes "relevant medical information." Ostensibly, a club physician could reveal to 
89 Section 7(i) of the NBA UPC provides that players must execute individual authorization(s) as requested by the 
team: "[i]fand to the extent necessary to enable or facilitate the disclosure of medical information as provided for by 
this Contract or Article XXJI of the CBA, the Player shall execute such individual authorization(s) as may be 
requested by the Team or as may be required by health care providers who examine or treat the Player." NBA UPC, 
Section 7(i): Physical Condition, available at http://www.nbpa.org/sites/default/files/EXIDBIT%20A.pdf. 
90See Michael Jay Kaplan, Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to Professional Sports, 18 A.L.R. Fed. 489 at § 
7[b] (1974). 
9IJd 
92 MLB UPC, available at http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_ english.pdf. 
93 MLB UPC Clause 6(b )(I). Medical Information. While this clause states that the team, including the team 
physician, "is prohibited from re-disclosing any such information without the express written consent of the 
Player[,]" this prohibition against re-disclosure is subject to the CBA Article XIII(G), which permits public 
disclosure for public relations purposes. See supra, Part IV, for a discussion ofMLB's CBA. 
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the team any medical information about a player, including medical information unrelated to the 
player's ability to engage in sports-related activity. 
Further, when a team contemplates assigning a player's UPC to another team or teams-
for example, when trading the player-the MLB UPC permits the team to disclose "all relevant 
medical information" to the other team or teams.94 While the UPC requires health information 
confidentiality on the part of the receiving team or teams and, moreover, requires the receiving 
team or teams to return the medical records if no assignment is concluded/5 the permitted 
relinquishment of the health information in the first place necessitates the player's waiver of his 
federal health privacy rights under HIP AA. 
2. National Basketball Association 
The NBA UPC96 likewise includes a clause referencing the use and disclosure of player 
health information. First, the UPC requires players to supply their team with "complete and 
truthful information with any medical examinations or requests for medical information 
authorized by [the UPC] (emphasis added)."97 Further, a player who consults any third party 
physician - that is, any physician other than the team physician -must provide the team with 
notice of that consultation and must authorize and direct the third party physician to provide the 
team with any requested medical information that the team's physician judges important to the 
player's ability to play "skilled basketball."98 So long as the team physician deems medical 
94 MLB UPC Clause 6(b )(2). 
95Jd ("In addition, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the Player's medical information, the physicians and 
officials of the Club which requested the medical information will return any and all documents received to the 
Player's Club, and will not keep copies of any documents it received or any other records indicating the substance of 
the medical information transmitted.") 
96 NBA UPC, Section 7: Physical Condition, available at 
http://www .nbpa.org/sites/defaultlfiles/EXHIBIT%20A.pdf. 
97 NBA UPC, Section 7(g). 
98 NBA UPC, Section 7(h). 
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information relevant to a player's ability to play basketball, any player-third party physician 
consultation is required to be disclosed to the team. 
Ostensibly,just as with the MLB CBA,99 NBA team physicians could reveal to the team 
any medical information about a player, including medical information unrelated to the player's 
ability to engage in sports-related activity. That is, a team physician's definition of 
"any ... medical information ... important to the player's ability to play 'skilled basketball"'100 
could be much more encompassing than necessary, requiring disclosure of any and all medical 
information. A more limited definition, one tailored only to information regarding a player's 
ability to engage in sports-related activity, should be employed. For example, a diagnosis of 
Psoriasis, which "is a common skin condition that causes skin redness and irritation" and often 
results in "thick, red skin with flaky, silver-white patches called scales"101 is likely not important 
to a player's ability to play "skilled basketball." However, a diagnosis of Hypertension, or high 
blood pressure, is likely always important to a player's ability to play "skilled basketball" 
because Hypertension, ineffectively treated, can lead to severe complications, including heart 
attack, heart failure, kidney disease, stoke, and vision problems.102 Under a limited definition-
of medical information important to a player's ability to play skilled basketball-tailored only to 
information regarding a player's ability to engage in sports-related activity, athletes would be 
better able to protect their health privacy as they would only be required to disclose certain 
health conditions. 
99 MLB UPC, Clause 6(b)(1) 
100 NBA UPC, Section 7(h). 
101 Psoriasis, A.D.A.M. Medical Encyclopedia, PubMed Health, 
http://www .ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth!PMHOOO 14 70/. 
102 Hypertension, A.D.A.M. Medical Encyclopedia, PubMed Health, 
http://www .ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth!PMHOOO 1502/. 
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The most expansive health privacy provision in the NBA UPC is located in Section 7(i), 
Physical Condition.103 This provision provides that players must execute individual 
authorization(s) as requested by the team in order to facilitate the disclosure of medical 
information as provided by Article XXII of the CBA.104 Thus, the NBA UPC requires 
professional basketball players to waive their federal privacy rights through forced authorizations 
for the use and disclosure of personal health information. By signing a UPC, thereby being able 
to play in the NBA, players are required to waive privacy rights that they otherwise would retain. 
C. MLBs "Authorization for the Use and/or Disclosure of Major League Player Health 
Information" 
Major League Baseball's CBA includes an "Authorization for the Use and/or Disclosure 
of Major League Player Health Information," ("MLB Authorization") a standard form 
authorization for the use and/or disclosure of personal health information.105 This authorization 
applies to "all health information about [the player]" that is in the "possession, custody or 
control" of certain health care providers, including the club physician, other physicians, 
laboratories, clinics, and club trainers. 106 Health information, as defmed by the MLB 
Authorization, means a player's 
"entire health or medical record, including, but not limited to, all 
information relating to any injury, sickness, disease, mental health 
condition, physical condition, medical history, medical or clinical status, 
103 NBA UPC, Section 7(i). 
104Jd ("If and to the extent necessary to enable or facilitate the disclosure of medical infonnation as provided for by 
this Contract or Article XXII of the CBA, the Player shall execute such individual authorization(s) as may be 
requested by the Team or as may be required by health care providers who examine or treat the Player."); see also 
NBA CBA, Article XXII. 
105 Authorization for the Use and/or Disclosure of Major League Player Health Infonnation, Attachment 18 to the 
CBA, available at http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_ english. pdf. 
106 Authorization for the Use and/or Disclosure of Major League Player Health Infonnation, Attachment 18 to the 
CBA, Clause 1-2. e'I authorize the following persons and entities (or classes of persons or entities) to use and/or 
disclose ... any of the health infonnation about me that is (or, during the period covered by this authorization, may 
be) in their possession, custody or control for the purposes described in paragraph 3 below: All health care providers 
(including but not limited to [add Club orthopedist and medical internist], other physicians, laboratories, clinics and 
Club trainers) with whom I have consulted pursuant to my Unifonn Player's Contract ("UPC") or the Basic 
Agreement.") 
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diagnosis, treatment or prognosis, including without limitation clinical 
notes, test results, laboratory reports, x-rays, and diagnosis imaging 
results." 1 07 
This health information may be disclosed to a certain enumerated list of persons. 108 
In addition to disclosure to the employing team, the MLB Authorization also allows for 
certain disclosures under Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment 
Program ("MLB Drug Program"). The MLB Authorization permits any health care provider 
with whom a player has consulted under the MLB Drug Program "to disclose to members of the 
Health Policy Advisory Committee health information about me [the player] (including, but not 
limited to, drug test results) that is .. .in their possession, custody or control.109 
While the MLB Authorization limits the nature of the disclosures authorized, 110 it states 
that HIP AA may not prevent the recipients of medical information (i.e., the team physician) from 
re-disclosing the information.111 Such re-disclosure is limited, however, by Paragraph 6(b) of the 
MLB UPC.112 The MLB Authorization does in fact limit the nature ofthe disclosure of player 
health information, but simultaneously requires players to acknowledge that they may not rely on 
their federal HIP AA privacy rights to limit the use or disclosure of personal health information. 
107 Authorization for the Use and/or Disclosure of Major League Player Health Infonnation, Attachment 18 to the 
CBA, Clause 1. 
108Jd Clause 3 (Authorizing disclosure to "the Owner, President, General Manager, Assistant General Manager, 
Manger, Physicians and such medical personnel as they may designate, Trainer and Assistant Trainer of the Club or 
Clubs for which I have agreed (or may agree) to render playing services during the period covered by this 
authorization and ... the Office ofthe Commissioner.") 
109Jd Clause 4. 
110Jd Clause 5. ("The disclosure of health infonnation pursuant to this authorization is solely for the purposes of 
this authorization. The health infonnation may not be disclosed to any person or entity other than those specified 
herein without my express written consent. The health infonnation may not be utilized for any purpose other than 
that specified herein without my express written consent ... This authorization is further conditioned upon the express 
understanding that neither the Major League Club to which I am under contract nor any other Major League Club 
will assert that the disclosure of health information pursuant to this authorization other than for the limited purposes 
specified herein constitutes a waiver of any right to privacy or confidentiality with respect to that medical 
information under federal or state law, or any regulation.") 
111Id Clause 6. 
112See supra, Part IV(B); MLB UPC Clause 6(b ). 
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That is, for example, a player cannot decide to prevent the team physician from revealing to the 
team a certain "set" of medical information. 
The MLB Authorization further states that if a player refuses to sign the authorization, he 
may nevertheless obtain treatment from the club physician.113 However, despite refusal to sign 
the authorization, the treating club physician will still disclose the player's personal health 
information to the employing team. 114 Most important, the MLB Authorization provides that a 
player's failure to sign the authorization, and its included limitations on health privacy, may 
constitute a breach of contract. 115 
The MLB Authorization's extensive provisions on player's health privacy comply with 
IDPAA authorization requirements.116 However, it is not the authorization itself that is of 
primary issue. Rather, the issue is in the requirement that players sign the MLB authorization 
and agree to its terms, including the wholesale wavier of health information privacy. 
D. Privacy and Performance Enhancing Drug Policies 
The National Labor Relations Board has held that drug testing of employees is a 
mandatory subject of collective bargaining.117 As such, the NBA CBA contains the league's 
performance enhancing drug policy.118 Conversely, MLB has adopted a performance-enhancing 
drug program separate from the MLB CBA- Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention 
and Treatment Program119 - that covers health confidentiality and the disclosure of player health 
information. While personal health information is obtained from the process of testing athletes 
113 Authorization for the Use and/or Disclosure of Major League Player Health Information, Attachment 18 to the 
CBA, Clause 7. 
114ld. 
115Jd 
116See 45 CFR 164.508. 
117 Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 NLRB 180, 182 (1989). 
118See NBA CBA, Article XXXIII, available at http://www.nbpa.org/sites/default/:files/ARTICLE%20XXXIII.pdf. 
119 Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, available at 
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/jda. pd£ 
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for performance-enhancing drug (e.g., steroid) use, a survey ofboth MLB and the NBA 
illustrates that personal health information in this context is treated somewhat differently than 
personal health information is generally treated. 
1. Major League Baseball 
MLB 's performance-enhancing drug policies, including testing policies, has become 
quite expansive in recent years. 120 This has been, in part, because of widespread criticism that 
MLB has in the past failed to adequately enforce steroid policies and penalties. 121 The current 
program- MLB's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program ("MLB Program" or "MLB 
Drug Program") -has a three-fold purpose: 1) "to educate Players ... on the risks associated with 
using" performance enhancing drugs and steroids; 2) "to deter and end the use by Players of' 
performance enhancing drugs and steroids; and 3) to provide for ... an orderly, systematic, and 
cooperative resolution of any disputes that may arise concerning the ... agreement."122 
The MLB Drug Program discusses health privacy in two sections, section six on 
confidentiality and section seven on disclosure of player information. The MLB Program clearly 
states that: "The confidentiality of Players' participation in the Program is essential to the 
Program's success."123 In order to ensure confidentiality, the MLB Program prevents the public 
disclosure of "information about an individual Player's test results or testing history, Initial 
Evaluation, diagnosis, Treatment Program ... , prognosis or compliance with a Treatment 
120See, e.g., Doug Miller, Players Welcome New Drug Policy, MLB.com, Nov. 15, 2005, 
http:/ /mlb.mlb.com/news/articlejsp?ymd=20051115&content_ id= 1268766&vkey=news _ mlb&fext= .jsp&c _ id=mlb; 
Mitchell Report: Baseball Slow to React to Player's Steroid Use, ESPN.com, Dec. 14,2007, 
http:/ /sports.espn.go.comlmlb/news/story?id=3153509. 
121Jd 
122 Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, available at 
http:/ /mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/jda.pdf. 
123 Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, Section 6, available at 
http:/ /mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/jda. pdf. 
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Program ... "124 While this provision seeks to prevent the public disclosure of player health 
information, as related to steroid testing, it does not purport to limit (or prevent) the disclosure of 
such information to the employing team. In fact, the provision assumes that such health 
information will be made available to the employing teams, without attempting to limit which 
team employees (e.g., General Manager) to which the information may be disclosed. 125 
Section 7 of the MLB Drug Program further polices the disclosure of player information. 
If a player is on the "Clinical Track,"126 his employing team is prohibited from public disclosure, 
including to the media, of any information regarding his participating in the MLB Drug 
Program.127 If a player is on the "Administrative Track"128 the detail of his treatment program, 
the results of any testing, and any discipline imposed, must remain strictly con:fi.dential.129 But, 
if a player is suspended under the MLB Program, a public statell:lent will be made, indicating 
only that the player was suspended for a specified number of days for a violation of the 
124 Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, Section 6(A). 
125Jd e'the Commissioner's Office, the Association, the Treatment Board, the IP A, the Medical Testing Officer, 
Club personnel, and all of their members, affiliates, consultant and employees, are prohibited from publicly 
disclosing information about an individual Player's [test results or participation the MLB Program] (emphasis 
added)"). 
126 All players who enter the MLB Drug Program as a result of use or suspected use of a Drug of Abuse are 
automatically placed on the Clinical Track. Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment 
Program, Section 4(B)(l). Drugs of Abuse are "Any and all drugs or substances included on Schedules I and II of 
the Code ofFederal Regulations' Schedule of Controlled Substances" and include cocaine, LSD, marijuana, opiates, 
Ecstasy, GHB, and Phencyclidine. Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, Section 
2(A). 
127 Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, Section 7(A)(l). 
128 A player is placed in the Administrative Track if: (1) the player tests positive under a performance enhancing 
drug test; (2) the Treatment Board determines that the player failed to cooperate with his Initial Evaluation (''The 
purpose of the Initial Evaluation is to ascertain whether the Player shall enter the Program and, if so, the type of 
Treatment Program that, in the opinion of the Treatment Board, would be most effective for the Player involved. 
The Initial Evaluation shall include at least one meeting between the Player and one or both of the Medical 
Representative(s)." Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, Section 4(D).); (3) the 
Treatment Board determines that the player failed to comply with his Treatment Program ("The Treatment Program 
may include any or all of the following: counseling, inpatient treatment, outpatient treatment and follow-up testing." 
Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, Section 4(E).); (4) the player is subject to 
discipline under Section 8 of the MLB Drug Program. Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and 
Treatment Program, Section 4(C). Performance enhancing substances are "Any and all anabolic androgenic steroids 
covered by Schedule Ill of the Code of Federal Regulations' Schedule of Controlled Substances." Over 50 
performance enhancing substances, as well as 30 stimulants, are enumerated. Major League Baseball's Joint Drug 
Prevention and Treatment Program, Section 2(B)-(C). 
129 Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, Section 7(A)(2). 
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program.130 This section also states that the Commissioner's Office may, without a player's 
consent, disclose the player's MLB Drug Program status to his employing team's general 
manager.131 The general manager may, in tum, disclose the information to the general manager 
of a team interested in acquiring the subject player - for example, in a trade.132 
MLB clearly protects a player's privacy when he tests positive for performance 
enhancing drugs, as well as when he tests positive for drugs of abuse, such as narcotics. The 
only public disclosure permitted is a discrete statement that informs of the player's suspension 
and that the suspension was for a violation of the MLB Drug Program. Thus, comparison of the 
MLB CBA and UPC with the MLB Drug Program indicates that MLB is concerned with athlete 
health privacy in some circumstances, but not in others. MLB 's disparate treatment of injury and 
drug test violations invites the question: should there be any difference between the two in terms 
of the public disclosure of personal health information? 
2. National Basketball Association 
The NBA CBA contains the league's Anti-Drug Program, including policies regarding 
confidentiality and performance-enhancing drugs. 133 Both the league and its teams are 
prohibited from publicly disclosing information about any players participating in the drug 
program.134 This includes information about test results and compliance with the league's drug 
l30ld 
131Jd ("In addition, other than in the case of a first positive test for a Stimulant, the Commissioner's Office may, 
without a Player's consent, disclose the Player's status on the Administrative Track, including a Player's likely 
availability to his Club, and/or the reason for any discipline imposed on the Player to the General Manager of the 
Player's Club, who shall keep such information confidential, except that the General Manager, and only he, may 
disclose such information to the General Manager of a Club that has expressed an interest in acquiring such Player's 
contract via assignment, and that General Manager also shall keep such information confidential.") 
132Jd 
133See NBA CBA, Article XXXIII, Section 3. 
134 NBA CBA, Article XXXIII, Section 3(a) e~other than as reasonably required in connection with the suspension 
of disqualification of a player, the NBA, the Teams, and the Player's Association, and all of their members, 
affiliates, agents, consultants, and employees, are prohibited from public disclosing information about the diagnosis, 
treatment, prognosis, test results, compliance, or the fact of participation of a player in the Program."). 
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· policies. 135 Upon a positive test for banned substances, the nature of the league's public 
disclosure depends on the circumstances of the failed test. If a player tests positive for a "Drug 
of Abuse or marijuana," the NBA will not make a public disclosure regarding the particular 
prohibited substance involved.136 However, if a player tests positive for conduct involving a 
steroid, a performance-enhancing drug, or a masking agent (collectively "SPED"), 137 the 
particular SPED will be publicly disclosed. 138 Just as MLB, the NBA is more restricted in what 
health information can be disclosed when the subject of the health information is related to 
performance-enhancing drug than when the subject is related to sports injury. Moreover, the 
NBA, like MLB, protects players' health privacy in terms of drug testing, but not in terms of 
injuries. 
E. HIP AA and Employment Records: The Employment Record Exception 
Protected health information139 excludes individually identifiable health information in 
"Employment records held by a covered entity in its role as an employer."140 When the 
definition of protected health information was amended to include this exclusion, HHS sought 
public comment regarding the change.141 In response to public concern, HHS stated that "a 
covered entity must remain cognizant of its dual roles as an employer and as a health care 
provider .. .Individually identifiable health information created, received, or maintained by a 
135ld. 
136Jd; The NBA CBA identifies Drugs of Abuse as amphetamines and their analogs (including but not limited to 
methamphetamine), cocaine, LSD, opiates, and Phencyclidine (PCP). NBA CBA, Exhibit 1-2, Prohibited 
Substances, available at http://www .nbpa.org/sites/default/files/EXHIBIT%201-2. pdf. 
137The NBA CBA's Anti-Drug Program defines a SPED as "any of the steroids, performance-enhancing drugs and 
masking agents listed in Exhibit 1-2 to this Agreement." NBA CBA, Article XXXIII, Section 1 ( o ). Exhibit 1-2 
identifies over 80 drugs that constitute SPEDs (steroids, performance enhancing drugs, or making agents) and, 
moreover, over 20 banned diuretics. NBA CBA, Exhibit 1-2, Prohibited Substances, available at 
http://www .nbpa.org/sites/default/files/EXHIBIT%201 -2 .pdf. 
138 NBA CBA, Article XXXIII, Section 3(a). 
139See supra, Part II. 
140 45 CFR 160.103, Protected Health Information (2)(iii). 
141See Federal Register, Volume 67, Number 157 at 53192 ("The Department [HHS] is sensitive to the concerns of 
commenters that a covered entity not abuse its access to an employee's individually identifiable health information 
which it has created or maintains in its health care, not its employer, capacity ... "). 
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covered entity in its health care capacity is protected health information."142 Thus, the 
employment record exception applies only to make clear that individually identifiable health 
information within the employee record that was submitted by the patient-employee does not 
make that employee record become protected health information. 
HHS has declined to defme what constitutes an employment record. 143 Thus, covered 
entities must decide, when dealing with an employee, whether the particular transaction was 
conducted as a health care provider or as an employer. When the covered entity acts as a health 
care provider, medical records are covered by HIP AA. 144 Conversely, when a covered entity 
acts solely as an employer - when "the entity is making hiring, frring, promotion, or payment 
decisions when it receives the employee's health information"- the information is part of the 
employment record and thus is afforded no HIP AA protection.145 Drug test results provide an 
effective example because of their applicability to professional sports teams. illP AA protection 
results "[w]hen the entity administers the drug screening test to the employee ... " 146 HIPAA 
protection does not result "[w]hen, pursuant to the employee's authorization, the test results are 
provided to the entity and placed into the employee's employment record."147 
In sum, if employers (here, professional sports teams and leagues) obtain health 
information for employment purposes, that health information is not subject to HIP AA Privacy 
Rule protection. However, if such employers create personal health information (generally as a 
142Jd. (HHS further stated: "It does not matter if the individual is a member of the covered entity's workforce or not. 
The [employer] ... in most cases will need the employee's authorization to access or use the medical information for 
employment purpose."). 
143 
"The Department does not believe that it has sufficient information to provide a complete definition of 
employment record ... but does clarify that ... files or records related to occupational injury, disability insurance 
eligibility, sick leave requests and justifications, drug screening results, workplace medical surveillance, and fitness-
for-duty tests of employees, may be part of the employment records maintained by the covered entity in its role as an 
employer. (emphasis added)." Federal Register (Vol. 67, Number 157) at 53192. 
144 Presentation by Luci L. Nelson, Confidentiality Requirements of Employment Laws, Ogletree Deakins Law 
Firm, available at http://www.gha.org/telnet/2472.pdf. 
I45Jd 
I46Jd 
147Jd 
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hybrid covered entity), HIP AA Privacy Ru1e protections do result. If employers (i.e., 
professional sports teams) find it necessary to use the personal health information of their 
athletes for any reason, they should make it their practice to obtain written authorizations from 
the athletes. Authorizations will put into place clear parameters as to what health information 
can be revealed and to whom. 
Part V: Athlete Injuries and Performance Enhancing Drug Violations 
A. The Health Care Provider-Patient Relationship and Confidentiality 
The American Medical Association (AMA) declares that a "physician shall respect the 
rights of patients and shall safeguard patient confidences within the constraints of the law."148 
Confidentiality, in the physician-patient context, is distinct from privacy. Confidentiality arises 
only when there is a special relationship between parties, such as exists between a physician and 
his patient.149 Once such a relationship exists, "[p ]ersonal information obtained in the course of 
that relationship should not be revealed to others unless the patient is first made aware and 
consents to its disclosure."150 When a special relationship, particularly the physician-patient 
relationship, is established, "only those with information derived from the special confidential 
relationship have a duty to maintain ... confidentiality ... confidentiality protects information 
privacy interest by requiring recipients of information deemed confidential to restrict access to 
that information."151 Ultimately, patients come to trust their physicians.152 
148 American Medical Association, Principles of Medical Ethics, Section IV, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/principles-medical-ethics.page? 
149 See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Privacy and Security of Health Information in the Emerging Health Care 
System, 5 Health Matrix 1, 3 (1995) ("Confidentiality is a form of informational privacy characterized by a special 
relationship"). 
150 ld 
151 Ilene N. Moore et al., Confidentiality and Privacy in Health Care From the Patient's Perspective: Does HIPAA 
Help?, 17 Health Matrix 215,221 (2007). 
152 
"Trust is the core, defining characteristic of the doctor-patient relationship-the 'gule' that holds the relationship 
together and makes it possible." Mark Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 463,470-71 (2002). While 
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Team physicians and trainers have conflicting duties to both the athletes they treat and 
the team entity that employs them. First, team health care providers must maintain their 
professional duty to respect the confidences of their patients. A team physician's unauthorized 
release of an athlete's medical condition to a third party- fo~ example, the media- violates a 
physician's ethical obligation to maintain his patient's confidentiality. 153 But, physicians and 
other health care providers employed by sports teams will often feel a sense of obligation to the 
team that employs them.154 
As far back as 1979 the public disclosure of athlete's health information was at issue. In 
Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, the plaintiff, Chuy, sought compensation from the 
Philadelphia Eagles when the team physician released his potentially career-ending medical 
condition to the press without his authorization.155 Dr. Nixon, the Eagles' team physician, was 
quoted in a Philadelphia Bulletin article confirming that Chuy had suffered a shoulder injury, had 
developed a pulmonary embolism, and that it was "recommended that Chuy no longer participate 
in contact sports such as pro footbal1."156 While Chuy's claim was based in tort rather than 
HIPAA focuses on the improper disclosure of personal health information, betrayal of trust is nevertheless a serious 
harm that results from a healthcare provider's breach of his patients' confidence. "[T]he physician is bound, ... upon 
his own professional honor and the ethics of his high profession, to keep secret [his patient's medical 
information] ... A wrongful breach of such confidence, and a betrayal of such trust, would give rise to a civil action 
for damages naturally flowing from such wrong." (emphasis added) Simonsen v. Swenson, 117 N.W. 831, 832 
(Neb. 1920). 
153See Matthew J. Mitten, Emerging Issues in Sports Medicine: A Synthesis, Summary, and Analysis, 76 St. John's 
L. Rev. 5 (2002); Biddle v. Warren, 715, N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1999). 
154See, e.g., Laura Miller, 8 Biggest Challenges Facing Team Physicians for Professional Athletes, Becker's 
Orthopedic, Spine and Pain Management Review, April 8, 2011, http://www.beckersorthopedicandspine.com/sports-
medicine/item/3646-8-biggest-challenges-facing-team-physicians-for-professional-athletes; see also Steve Chen and 
Enrico Esposito, Practical and Critical Legal Concerns for Sports Physicians and Athletic Trainers, The Sports 
Journal, http://www. thesportjournal.org/article/practical-and-critical-legal-concerns-sport-physicians-and-athletic-
trainers ("When a ... professional sports team hires the team physicians, a duty is created not only between the 
physicians and the athletes, but also to the hiring entity. Although the well-being of athletes should be the most 
important concern of physicians and trainers who render medical service, it is not always easy for physicians and 
trainers to make their decisions based on this principle due to the immense pressure from the coaches, management, 
the press, and even the motivated athletes themselves."). 
155 Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (1979). 
156 Jd. at 1284. 
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federal health privacy law,157 which did not exist in 1979, his claim nevertheless illustrates that 
physicians (as well as other health care providers, such a athletic trainers) owe a duty of 
confidentiality to their patients, even in the professional sports setting. This case further shows 
that it is best practice for team health care providers to obtain an athlete's authorization before 
disclosing any medical information to anyone, including the employing team itself. That is, team 
health care providers should not rely solely on league documents, such as the CBA or UPC, but 
should rather obtain individual authorizations to release medical information, thereby protecting 
their ethical obligation to maintain patient confidences. 
B. Disclosures of Athletes' Injuries 
Public disclosure of athletes' injuries is generally not a very structured event. 
Specifically, teams freely speak in the pubic forum about their player's injuries, often including 
how long an injury is likely to prevent a player from engaging in sports-related activities and 
steps undertaken to rehabilitate or correct the injury. In fact, the National Football League 
(NFL) requires teams to disclose all player injuries to the league, other teams, and the media. 158 
Take for example, the 2011 MLB World Series between the St. Louis Cardinals and the Texas 
157 Breaches of physician-patient confidentiality have traditionally been governed by state law, as in Chuy. State 
courts have developed common law rules to protect the confidences revealed by the patient to the physician. For 
example, in Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 298 Or. 706 (1985), the Supreme Court of Oregon found 
a cognizable breach of confidentiality claim where a physician helped a woman, who was not his patient, to reveal 
the identity of her mother, who gave the woman up for adoption at birth and was the physician's patient. See, also, 
Berger v. Sonneland, 101 Wash.App. 141 (2000) (allowing state law action for unauthorized disclosure of patient's 
confidential information); Herman v. K.ratche, 2006 WL 3240680 (Ohio Ct. App.) (2006) (tort exists for the 
unauthorized disclosure to a third party ofnonpublic medical information that a physician learns as a result of the 
physician-patient relationship). 
158See, Mike Reiss, NFL: How Hurt Is He? The Lists Don't Tell, New York Times, Nov. 8, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/09/sports/09iht-nf1.3461396.html; Scott Boeck and Skip Wood, Analysis: Injury 
Report is Game Within the Game, USA Today, Nov. 25,2007, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2007-
11-22-injury-report-cover _ N .htm. 
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Rangers where news reports abound about player injuries with most speculating whether those 
injured players would be able to continue play in the World Series.159 
In light of professional sports leagues' CBAs and UPCs, teams and leagues are 
essentially free to disclose any player health information that they see fit. 160 If the leagues 
employ an authorization, such as MLB's "Authorization for the Use and/or Disclosure of Major 
League Player Health Information,"161 HIP AA has been complied with. Because individuals, 
including professional athletes, can authorize any use or disclosure of their personal health 
information as they see fit, an authorization allows teams and leagues to disclose injuries while 
not violating players' privacy rights. However, authorizations of this sort should be as specific 
as possible, clearly stating which disclosures the player has agreed to and under what 
circumstances those disclosures can be made. That is, teams and leagues should not employ 
blanket authorizations. 
C. Disclosure of Performance Enhancing Drug Testing Violations 
In contrast to sports injuries, the leagues, rather than individual teams, disclose 
performance-enhancing drug violations.162 Consequently, a team is unable to publicly comment 
about its player's drug testing violations unless the individual player authorizes it to so comment. 
It becomes clear from the privacy-protective policies of the anti-drug programs ofMLB and the 
159See, e.g., Richard Durrett, Nelson Cruz, Mike Napoli in Lineup, ESPNDallas.com, Oct. 28,2011, 
http://espn.go.com/dallas/mlb/story I _/id/7161443/20 11-world-series-texas-rangers-nelson-cruz-mike-napoli-lineup-
injuries; R.B. Fallstrom, Cards' Holliday to Miss World Series Game 7, Yahoo! Sports, Oct. 28, 2011, 
http:/ /sports.yahoo.com/mlb/news?slug=ap-worldseries-cardinals-holliday. 
160See, supra, Part IV for a discussion of the provisions of the CBAs and UPCs ofMLB and the NBA that permit 
disclosure of injured player health information. 
161See, supra, Part IV, Section B. 
162See Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, Section 7(A)(2) ("the only public 
comment from the Club or the Commissioner's Office shall be that the Player was suspended for a specified number 
of days for a violation ofthis Program ... "); NBA CBA, Article XXXlli, Section 3(a) ("If a player is suspended or 
disqualified for conduct involving a Drug of Abuse or marijuana, the NBA shall not publicly disclose the particular 
Prohibited Substance involved, absent the agreement of the Players Association or the prior disclosure of such 
information by the player (or by a person authorized by the player to disclose such information). If a player is 
suspended or disqualified for conduct involving a SPED, the particular SPED shall be publicly disclosed along with 
the announcement of the applicable penalty."). 
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NBA that the professional sports leagues value player health privacy more when that privacy is 
related to performance-enhancing drugs than when it is related to injury. 
As with injuries, if the leagues employ an authorization, whereby players can, in written 
form, waive their rights to health privacy, HIP AA has been complied with. Moreover, as with 
injuries, authorizations should be as specific as possible, specifically enumerating what 
information can be released and to whom. Authorizations are a major issue of health privacy in 
sports, however. Essentially, should professional sports leagues and teams be able to require 
players to sign authorizations, often blanket authorizations, thereby waiving all of their federal 
health privacy rights? 
Part VI: Recommendations 
A. Compliance: All Professional Sports Organizations Should Adopt a Uniform Authorization 
Template 
While this comment argues that professional sports teams and leagues should be HIP AA 
covered entities, 163 there is nevertheless uncertainty regarding whether they are such entities. 164 
As a result of this uncertainty, professional sports teams (and their respective leagues) should 
employ authorizations for the release of personal health information. These authorizations, 
moreover, should comply with HIPAA's authorization requirements.165 
By obtaining comprehensive authorizations from every athlete that specifically 
enumerate the information permitted to be disclosed, the parties who may disclose, the parties to 
whom disclosure may be made, and the purposes for which disclosure may be made, professional 
163See, supra, Part III. 
164See, supra, note 59 and accompanying text. HHS has decline to affirmatively state one way or the other whether 
professional sports teams are HIP AA covered entities. 
165 As defined in 45 CFR 164.508. Authorizations for the use and/or disclosure of personal health information must 
contain the following elements: (1) description of the information to be used or disclosed that specifically identifies 
the information; (2) name or specific identification of the person(s) authorized to make the use or disclosure; (3) 
name or specific identification of the person(s) to whom disclosure can be made; (4) description of the purpose of 
the requested use or disclosure; (5) expiration date or expiration event that relates to the individual or the purpose of 
the use or disclosure; (6) signature ofthe individual and date. 45 CFR 164.508(c)(l)(i)~(vi). 
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sports teams will be in compliance with HIP AA, including the HIP AA Privacy Rule.166 
However, rather than forcing professional athletes to agree to authorizations, presumably though 
CBAs and UPCs, teams should provide their players with a meaningful opportunity to limit 
authorizations for the disclosure of personal health information. That is, teams should not 
merely rely on blanket authorizations.167 For example, the circumstances under which 
individuals agreed to and sign blanket authorizations can be coercive.168 A coercive 
authorization would likely make the authorization unenforceable.169 Moreover, individuals 
agreeing to and signing authorizations may not completely understand what they are signing and 
exactly what information may be released.170 While blanket authorizations are appealing to 
teams from a convenience perspective, ''[a] one-time blanket authorization signed by a patient 
that permits the release of 'any and all' information is not permissible.under HIPAA because it 
does not meet the requirements that the authorization be described in a specific and meaningful 
fashion."171 
A uniform authorization template should, at the player's request, limit the nature of the 
information that is subject to public disclosure. Public disclosures could thus be limited to on-
the-field injuries and off-the-field physical injuries172 that affect a player's performance. For 
example, Major League Baseball's New York Yankees would be free to publicly disclose Alex 
166Jd. 
167 
"Blanket authorizations have traditionally been used by covered entities upon a patient's first visit to a facility or 
at the onset of each visit ... Blanket authorizations must be given special consideration in light of the specific 
authorization requirements [see, supra, note 165] ... that the HIPAA privacy rule has imposed." Laurinda B. 
Harman, Ethical Challenges in the Management of Health Information 59 (2nd ed. 2006). 
168Jd 
169 Jd. "A one-time blanket authorization signed by a patient that permits the release of 'any and all' information is 
not permissible under HIP AA because it does not meet the requirement that the authorization be described in a 
specific and meaningful fashion." 
170Jd 
171Jd. 
172 As opposed to mental health issues, which should not be disclosed unless they completely prevent a player from 
engaging in sports-related activities. See, e.g., Greene on DL for 2nd Time With Anxiety, ESPN.com, June 29, 
2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=4295644 (outlining MLB's Khalil Greene's consistent issues 
with anxiety). 
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Rodriguez's 2011 knee surgery173 but the Kansas City Royals would not, without obtaining 
additional authorization, be able to publicly reveal Zack Greinke's battle with depression and 
social anxiety. 174 The point is this: there are certain off~the~field injuries, or more properly 
medical ailments, that are either irrelevant to athletic performance or unimportant in the short 
run. For example, most would agree that Alopecia Areata, which is "a condition that causes 
round patches of hair loss, and can lead to total hair loss,"175 is an off-the-field medical ailment 
that is irrelevant to the athletic performance of any professional athlete. Likewise, most would 
agree that Huntington's disease, which is a disease that, over time, can cause the brain cells to 
degenerate, 176 is unimportant in the short run. Although it could be argued that young players 
trying to break into the professional leagues would sell their soul for any chance they could get 
to play professionally, including disclosing anything the team wanted them to, players in the 
middle or twilight of their careers are unlikely to want such personal medical information 
floating throughout the public forum. 
B. Amelioration: Professional Athletes Should Be Aware of Their Federal Health Privacy 
Rights, Thus Enabling Those Rights to Be Asserted in CBA Negotiations 
If a HIP AA covered entity, or an individual agent of a covered entity, uses or discloses 
protected health information for any unauthorized purpose- for example, to "snoop" on a 
173 Ian Begley and Mike Mazzeo, Alex Rodriguez to Have Knee Surgery, ESPN.com, July 11,2011, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/new-york/mlb/news/story?id=6754883. 
174 John Donovan, 'A Long Way to Go' Greinke Battles Depression in Bid for K.C. Rotation, SI.com, Mar. 15, 
2007, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2007 h.yriters/john _ donovan/03/15/royals.greinke/index.html; It could be 
argued that mental health issues, such as depression, or, more likely, social anxiety, factor into how professional 
athletes are able to handle high-pressure situations, such as the playoffs or playing for a large-market, media 
saturated team like theN ew York Yankees or the Boston Red Sox. I do not dispute that an athlete, for example, 
Zack Greinke, should inform his team of such mental health issues before commencing contract negotiations. 
Teams should be able to count on their players to be able to handle stressful game situations, such as starting a 
World Series game. But, these intimate health statuses need not be publicly disclosed. We, spectators and fans, 
have no legitimate interest in knowing or need to know of such player health matters. 
175 Alopecia Areata, A.D.A.M. Medical Encyclopedia, PubMed Health, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth!PMH0002421/. 
176 Huntington's Disease, A.D.A.M. Medical Encyclopedia, PubMed Health, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth!PMH0001775/. 
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celebrity patient or "break" the news of an NFL star's season-ending injury to the local 
sportswriter- HHS may impose penalties. 177 The HIP AA penalty framework divides penalties 
into two levels: (1) the general penalty and (2) the specific penalty. Failure to comply with 
HIP AA regulations can result in civil monetary penalties under the general penalty and, more 
harshly, both fmancial and criminal penalties under the specific penalty. 178 
The general penalty distinguishes between a covered entity violator's mental state in 
determining the penalty severity. These employee mental states include, in progressive order of 
severity: (1) the violator did not know (and by exercising reasonable diligence would not have 
known) of the violation; (2) the violation was due to reasonable cause; (3) the violation was due 
to willful neglect; (4) the violation was due to willful neglect and was not corrected.179 The civil 
penalty amounts begin at $100 and can increase to $1.5 million.180 Although HHS has wide 
discretion in imposing the general penalty for Privacy Rule violations, " [a] violation of a 
provision ... due to willful neglect is a violation for which the Secretary [of HHS] is required to 
impose a penalty."181 
The specific penalty, likewise, distinguishes between a violator's mental state in 
determining the penalty severity. Any person who knowingly violates HIPAA by "obtain[ing] 
individually identifiable health information relating to an individual" or by "disclos[ing] 
individually identifiable health information to another person shall be punished."182 A knowing 
violation ofHIPAA can result in a fmancial penalty of up to $50,000 and a prison sentence of up 
to one year. A knowing violation under false pretenses can result in a fmancial penalty of up to 
177 42 u.s.c. § 1320d-5 (1996). 
178Jd 
179 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(a)(l)(A)-(C) (1996). 
180 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(a)(3)(A)-(D). 
181 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(c)(l) (1996). 
182 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a)(l)-(3). 
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$1 00,000 and a prison sentence of up to five years. Lastly, a knowing violation with the intent to 
sell, transfer, or use individually identifiable health information for commercial advantage, 
person gain, or malicious harm can result in a financial penalty of up to $250,000 and a prison 
sentence of up to 1 0 years. 183 As is evident from the potential severity of the financial penalty, 
coupled with the possibility of prison time, the specific penalty is much harsher than the general 
penalty. 
While this substantial statutory framework is in place, permitting HHS to take action 
against violating entities by issuing penalties, HIP AA does not include a private right of 
action. 184 Essentially, a person substantially affected by a medical privacy "leak" is without 
individual rights to sue. The only action the aggrieved individual can take is to file a complaint 
with HHS 185 and hope that HHS will then decide to act on the complaint pursuant to its 
enforcement powers.186 Consequently, HIPAA, specifically the Privacy Rule, does not have 
much force from an individual perspective. Yet this does not mean that professional athletes 
should not enjoy the protections entitled to them by the HIPAA statute. Rather, professional 
athletes should employ their federal health privacy rights as an ameliorative measure. 
183 42 u.s.c. § 1320d-6(b)(1)-(3). 
184 HIPAA does not provide for individual causes of action. See e.g., Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. CA, 
2006) (upholding a district court decision that HIP AA does not afford a private right of action). However, HHS 
does accept Privacy Rule violation complaints from anyone. See Health Information Privacy Complaint Form, 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/complaints/hipcomplaintform.pdf. Some have argued against 
this existing framework and instead for an individual cause of action. A private right of action would provide 
individualized rights of action for aggrieved patients. See, e.g., Joshua D.W. Collins, Toothless HIPAA: Searching 
for a Private Right of Action to Remedy Privacy Rule Violations, 60 V AND. L. REv. 199 (2007) and Sharon a 
Hoffinan and Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic Private 
Health Information, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 331,354-59 (2007). 
185 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.306 (2006); Health Information Privacy Complaint Form, available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/complaints/hipcomplaintform.pdf. 
186 
"Although the [HIPAA] statute allows the HHS Secretary to impose civil and criminal sanctions on those who 
blatantly ignore the Privacy Rule regulations, this type of enforcement only deters future violations - it does nothing 
to compensate those patients who have suffered real and direct harm as a result of such unauthorized disclosures." 
Joshua D.W. Collins, Toothless HIP AA: Searching for a Private Right of Action to Remedy Privacy Rule Violations, 
60 V AND. L. REV. 199.232 (2007). 
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If professional athletes are cognizant of their federal health privacy rights under HIP AA, 
those rights could serve as a valuable bargaining chip for athletes that could lead to team and 
league concessions. Essentially, players, through their respective player's association, could 
assert federal health privacy rights as a means to gain valuable concessions on other important 
issues. When engaging in CBA negotiations, for example, players could use HIP AA to extract 
better terms, whether a higher minimum salary, a pension system for retired players, or, in the 
case of the National Football League, heightened league and ownership responsibilities in 
combating and controlling dangerous game-induced head trauma, namely concussions. 
Concussions in the National Football League (NFL) have become a problem of exceeding 
concem.187 Since July 2011 more than a dozen lawsuits have been filed "on behalf of more than 
120 retired players and their wives" alleging that "the N.F.L. and in some cases helmet 
manufacturers deliberately concealed information about the neurological effects of repeated hits 
to the head."188 While these lawsuits will undoubtedly face many roadblocks, and may 
ultimately result in victory for the NFL, the NFL has begun to respond to criticism of its 
handling of head trauma. For example, the NFL, in 2010, began alerting current players about 
the long-term effects of concussions through posters and documents.189 More importantly, in 
187 See Alan Schwarz, N.F.L. Scolded Over Injuries to Its Players, New York Times, Oct. 28,2009, 
http://www .nytimes.com/2009/1 0/29/sports/football/29hearing.html? _ r= 1 &scp=5&sq=concussions%20judiciary%2 
Ocommittee%20october%202009&st=cse ("With evidence mounting of a link between playing professional football 
and cognitive impairment in later life, and news reports of poor medical treatment for some former players with 
dementia and other signs of mental decline, the [House Judiciary] committee repeatedly challenged the 
commissioner, Roger Goodell, to defend the league's policies and research."); Sam Borden, N.F.L. Plans Broader 
Concussion Research, New York Times, Oct. 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/201111 0/04/sports/football/nfl-
plans-more-scientific-study-of-concussions.html; Alan Schwarz, N.F.L. Acknowledges Long-Term Concussion 
Effects, New York Times, Dec. 20,2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/21/sports/football/21concussions.html?pagewanted=all. 
188 Ken Belson, For N.F.L., Concussion Suits May Be Test for Sport Itself, New York Times, Dec. 29,2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/sports/footballlnfl-faces-retired-players-in-a-high-stakes-legal-
battle.html?pagewanted=all. 
189 Id ('~One poster created by the league used words like 'depression' and 'early onset of dementia'. Another 
document warned players that repeated concussions 'can change you life and your family's life forever,' a nod to 
retired players' wives who have spoken out on the issue."). 
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December 2011 the NFL began stationing certified athletic trainers at all games to monitor 
players for concussion symptoms.190 Despite the widespread public discussion about 
concussions in the NFL and the NFL' s new precautions, head trauma is an inevitable part of 
football. In fact, some players have revealed that they are still willing to hide concussions from 
their physicians, athletic trainers, coaches and teams, despite their increased knowledge of the 
risks concussions pose.191 
Because of the long-term risks associated with head trauma, players clearly want better 
head injury protection, including protection from their own judgment (or lack thereo:t). 192 If NFL 
players, through the NFL Players Association, asserted their federal health privacy rights under 
IDP AA, they could conceivably use those rights to extract better CBA terms related to the NFL' s 
required response to and prevention of football-related head trauma, including better in-game 
care, better access to long-term health care, and even increased penalties for players who engage 
in play prohibited by NFL rules and regulations.193 
C. MLB As A Useful Model For All Professional Leagues 
190 Jason La Confora, NFL Stationing Trainers in Stadiums to Monitor Concussions, NFL Network, Dec. 20,2011, 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d82540bae/article/nfl-stationing-trainers-in-stadiums-to-monitor-
concussions. 
191 Howard Fendrich, Some NFL Players Still Willing to Hide Concussions, USA Today, Dec. 26,2011, 
http://www .usatoday .com/sports/football/nfllstory /20 11-12-26/concussions-players-hide/52231 02411 ("In a series of 
interviews about head injuries ... 23 of 44 NFL players- slightly more than half- said they would try to conceal a 
possible concussion rather than pull themselves out of a game. Some have acknowledged they already have. 
Players also said they should be better protected from their own instincts: More than two-thirds ofthe group ... wants 
independent neurologists on sidelines during games."). 
192 ld 
193 For example, the NFL prohibits unnecessary roughness, including use of the helmet in tackling and blocking. 
Under NFL Rule 12, Player Conduct, Article 8, Section (g), it is unnecessary roughness "if a player uses any part of 
his helmet (including the top/crown and foreheadl'hairline" parts) or facemask to butt, spear, or ram an opponent 
violently or unnecessarily." Further, Article 13, Section (3) requires that "In covering the passer position, Referees 
will be particularly alert to fouls in which defenders impermissibly use the helmet and/or facemask to hit the passer, 
or use hands, arms, or other parts of the body to hit the passer forcibly in the head or neck area ... This rule does not 
prohibit incidental contact by the mask or non-crown parts of the helmet in the course of a conventional tackle on a 
passer." NFL Rulebook, available at http://www.nfl.com/rulebook. 
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Major League Baseball has, arguably, the most extensive policies currently in place 
governing the disclosure of player injuries and player performance enhancing drug violations. 194 
MLB goes as far as to include, in the MLB CBA, an authorization that regulates the use and 
disclosure of major league player health information.195 The extensive policies employed by 
Major League Baseball, as negotiated by the MLB Player's Association in the MLB CBA, and 
the inclusion of an authorization make MLB a useful and practical model for all professional 
sports leagues in the United States to follow. 
There is, however, one major problem with MLB's model: it requires, under the CBA, all 
players to execute the Authorization for the Use and/or Disclosure of Major League Player 
Health Information.196 But, MLB's policies do limit the nature of these required 
authorizations.197 Moreover, Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment 
Program places strict regulations on player's confidentiality when in the realm of testing for 
performance enhancing drug use.198 
Professional sports leagues should implement policies that closely mirror what MLB has 
done. First, leagues should clearly and specifically defme what health information each player is 
required to disclose to his respective team and what that information will be used for once it is 
within the team's purview. Teams should use a player's personal health information only to 
make sports-related personnel decisions, and, when necessary, to let the public know of a 
player's status as it relates to his ability to engage in sports-related activity. This would mean 
that only certain organizational members should have access to player health information. While 
194 See, supra, Part IV. 
195 See, supra, note 105. 
196 MLB CBA, Article XIII(G)(l), available at, http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf. 
197 See, supra, notes 1 06-11 0 and accompanying text. 
198 Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, Section 6, available at 
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/jda.pdf. 
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this list of individuals should generally be limited to management, coaches, team physician, and 
team athletic trainers, situations could arise where this list could be expanded, for example, when 
another team is taking steps necessary to acquire the particular player (i.e., in a trade). 
Second, leagues should implement a standard authorization. 199 This authorization should 
delineate, with specificity, what health information the team is permitted to disclose and to 
whom. Ideally, only health information that is related to an athlete's ability to engage in sports-
related activity, including on-the-field injuries, will be publicly disclosed. While the league is 
undoubtedly permitted to require players to agree to an authorization for the release of certain 
personal health information as a condition of the Uniform Player Contract, as MLB does - that 
is, in order to play in the league - it would be best practice for the league not to do so. The UPC 
in any particular league should not require a player to waive his federal health privacy rights. It 
can be argued that professional athletes generally receive· significant annual salaries, salaries that 
hinge upon management knowing the health risks the organization undertakes when players are 
signed to such large contracts. Professional sports teams should take all necessary precautions 
when signing a player to a large contract, including ensuring comprehensive knowledge of that 
player's medical history. But, ensuring that a player truthfully reveals his medical history in 
conjunction with singing a UPC is entirely different than requiring a player to sign an 
authorization that permits the team to use and disclose his past and future medical conditions. 
Third, leagues should ensure that performance enhancing drug testing is achieved with 
the utmost level of confidentiality. Just as MLB requires, a drug testing program should prevent 
public disclosure of"information about an individual Player's test results or testing history, 
Initial Evaluation, diagnosis, Treatment Program ... , prognosis or compliance with a Treatment 
199 See, supra, Part IV(C) for a discussion of the authorization employed by Major League Baseball. 
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Program ... "200 The only public disclosure that should be permitted, when a violation occurs, is a 
discrete statement that informs of the players suspension and that the suspension was for a 
violation of the league's drug testing program. 
D. Conclusion 
Sports injuries and performance-enhancing drug testing are not new phenomena; they 
will continue for as long as competitive professional sports are played. In February 2012 
Milwaukee Brewers MVP and all-star Ryan Braun became MLBs frrst player to successfully 
appeal a positive drug test and thus avoid a 50-game suspension?01 While MLB has adhered to 
its policy of confidentiality when a player tests positive for performance-enhancing drugs, 
uncertainty surrounds Braun's integrity, and moreover, his reputation?02 Whatever one thinks of 
Braun's guilt or innocence, or why he tested positive,203 we must respect his health privacy. 
Sports injuries are a major part of American professional sports organizations. Moreover, 
performance-enhancing drug testing has become an ever-increasing aspect of professional sports 
leagues, particularly in recent years. While injuries are inevitable, and performance-enhancing 
drug testing is necessary, professional sports teams and leagues must strive to respect their 
player's federal health privacy rights, as prescribed by HIP AA. We all except a certain level of 
privacy in our everyday lives, including the privacy of our personal health information. Just 
200 Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, Section 6(A). 
201 Ken Belson, Braun Wins Appeal on Positive Drug Test and Avoids Suspension, New York Times, Feb. 23,2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/sports/baseballlbraun-wins-appeal-on-positive-drug-test-and-will-avoid-
suspension.html?scp=5&sq=ryan%20braun%20steroids&st=cse. 
202 Jd Braun said that winning his appeal "is the first step in restoring [his] good name and reputation." 
203 Wide speculation has surrounded the reason for Ryan Braun's positive performance-enhancing drug test. For 
example, some have speculated that he failed the test because of medication he was taking to treat an STD. 
However, Braun has denied this, saying that he has "[n]ever [had] a personal medical issue [and] never had an 
STD." He further stated: "[m]any of the of the erroneous stories reported by the networks continue to live on, which 
is disappointing." Aaron Gleeman, Ryan Braun Press Conference Notes and Quotes, NBC Sports HardballTalk, 
Feb. 24, 20 12, http:/ lhardballtalk.nbcsports. com/2 0 12/02/24/ryan-braun-press-conference-notes-and-quotes/. 
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because professional athletes work in a segment of the entertainment industry does not mean 
they should not be afforded the same level of privacy that you and I expect 
Every American professional sports team and league should employ injury and 
performance-enhancing drug testing authorizations that comply with the HIP AA Privacy Rule. 
Doing so will ensure that athletes are cognizant of their federal health privacy rights and, 
moreover, that teams and league, as HIP AA covered entities, are in compliance with HIP AA 
regulations. It is vital, however, that any authorization employed must be neither coercive nor a 
blanket authorization that purports to permit the use and disclosure of any player health 
information, even information that does not relate to the player's ability to engage in sports-
related activity. Authorizations that are coercive or over-encompassing would likely render them 
unenforceable and would thus subject the teams or league to HIP AA Privacy Rule violation 
liability. Although HIP AA compliance is certainly not ideal for either teams or leagues from an 
administrative or self-interest perspective, professional athlete's federal health privacy rights 
must be respected and teams and leagues must be held accountable for violations of those rights. 
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